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COMMENT
Saks: A Clarification of the Warsaw
Convention Passenger Liability Standards
Valerie Saks was a passenger on a flight originating in Paris
and bound for Los Angeles.' During descent, and while cabin pres-
sure was being adjusted, Saks felt an uncomfortable "ringing" in
her ears.2 Several days later, doctors diagnosed Saks' condition as a
permanent hearing loss in her left ear.' Saks filed suit against Air
France in San Francisco superior court, but later removed to the
U.S. district court.4 In her suit, Saks alleged that the cause of her
injury was a normal change in cabin pressurization during landing,
and further alleged that this occurrence was sufficient to impose
liability on the airline under the Warsaw Convention' as modified
by the Montreal (Interim) Agreement.6 Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention imposes liability on an airline for a passenger's injury
"if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place
on board the aircraft."'7 The United States District Court for the
Northern District of California granted Air France's motion for
summary judgment on the grounds that the changes in cabin pres-
sure were normal and did not constitute an accident within the
1. Carrizosa, Ninth Circuit OKs Deaf Woman's Suit Against Air France, L.A. Daily J.,




5. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transpor-
tation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876,137 L.N.T.S. 11 (1934) reprinted in
49 U.S.C. §1502 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention].
6. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD AGREEMENT 18900, AGREEMENT RELATING TO LIABILITY
LIMTATIONS OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION AND THE HAGUE PROTOCOL (1966) approved by
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, ORDER No. E-23680 reprinted in 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966) [here-
inafter cited as Montreal Agreement].
7. Warsaw Convention, supra note 5 art. 17. The full text of article 17 reads:
The carrier shall be liable for damages sustained in the event of the death or
wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if
the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the air-
craft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.
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meaning of article 17.8 On appeal, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision on
the ground that article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, as modified
by the Montreal Agreement, imposed absolute liability on the air
carrier and, therefore, a showing of a malfunction or abnormality
in the aircraft's operation was not a prerequisite for the plaintiff's
recovery as long as the injury was the result of an inherent risk in
air travel.' The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari re-
view. On March 4, 1985, the Court reversed, holding that an air
carrier, under article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, is liable for a
passenger's injury only if that injury was caused by an unexpected
or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger.'"
This comment will briefly examine the history of the Warsaw
Convention. Next, it will address the standards developed by the
federal courts for invoking the Convention's airline liability provi-
sions. Finally, the Supreme Court's decision resolving the split be-
tween the circuits will be examined.
In 1934 the U.S. Senate ratified the Warsaw Convention mak-
ing it a U.S. treaty." Today the treaty is in force in over 100 coun-
tries. The Warsaw Convention had several goals. First the Conven-
tion was designed to provide uniform rules to govern the rights and
liabilities of airlines and their passengers. This was accomplished
by defining international transportation,' 2 by establishing rules
governing jurisdiction, 3 and by creating a two-year period of limi-
tations. " Second, the Convention was designed to protect the new
airline industry from potentially ruinous financial exposure by
placing a ceiling on liability, 5 thus ensuring its survival and
growth.' 6 This goal was achieved by limiting the carriers' liability
8. Saks v. Air France, 724 F.2d 1383, 1384 (9th Cir. 1984).
9. Id. at 1385.
10. Air France v. Saks, 724 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 53 U.S.L.W. 4270 (March 4,
1985) (No. 83-1785).
11. Warsaw Convention, supra note 5. As a treaty, the Convention supersedes all do-
mestic law in the area of liability of international air carriers. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
12. Article 1(2) defines international transportation as transportation between con-
tracting states, or transportation within a single contracting state if there is a stopping place
within the territory of a non-contracting state. Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, art. 1(2).
13. Article 28 makes jurisdiction over the carrier proper where the carrier is domiciled,
where it has its principal place of business, where the contract for carriage was entered into,
or the place of destination of the flight. Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, art. 28.
14. Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, art. 29.
15. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80
HARV. L. REv. 497, 498 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn].
16. See id., at 499-500. When submitting the Warsaw Convention to the United States
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to approximately $8,300.17 To offset this burden on the passenger,
the Convention imposed on the carrier a rebuttable presumption of
negligence in case of accident."8 To overcome this presumption the
carrier had to prove that all possible measures were taken to avoid
the accident, or prove that it was impossible to avoid the acci-
dent.l9 This constituted, in essence, a defense of due care. If it was
shown that the carrier had engaged in willful misconduct, then the
carrier was barred from claiming any limitations on liability.20
Not long after the United States became a party to the treaty,
the signatory countries began proposing revisions of a number of
the Convention's provisions, 1 especially those concerning limita-
tions on air carrier liability.22 Those who were in favor of raising
the limits on a passenger's recovery argued that damage awards for
personal injury and death in many developed countries were higher
than those allowed under the Convention. Another argument was
that because of the availability of low-cost liability insurance, the
burden on airlines would be minimal. Finally, although the initial
purpose of the limitations was to protect the young airline indus-
try, this purpose would be largely irrelevant since the industry had
become well established. Raising these views brought forth some
results. In 1955, the Convention's signatories reconvened at the
Senate, Secretary of State Cordell Hull wrote:
It is believed that the principle of limitation of liability will not only be benefi-
cial to passengers and shippers as affording a more definite basis of recovery and
as tending to lessen litigation, but that it will prove to be an aid in the develop-
ment of international air transportation, as such limitation will afford the carrier
a more definite and equitable basis on which to obtain insurance rates, with the
probable result that there would eventually be a reduction of operating expenses
for the carrier and advantages to travelers and shippers in the way of reduced
transportation charges.
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Message From the President of the United States
Transmitting A Convention For the Unification of Certain Rules, S. Exec. Doc. No. G., 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934).
17. Article 22(1) limited any recovery to 125,000 Poincare francs which, at the time of
the signing of the Convention, was equivalent to $8,292. Comment, Aviation Law: Attempts
to Circumvent the Limitations of Liability Imposed on Injured Passengers by the Warsaw
Convention, 54 CHI. KENT. L. REV. 851, 851 n.6 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Comment, At-
tempts to Circumvent the Limitations].
18. See, Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, for the text of article 17.
19. Article 20(1) provides in part: "In the carriage of passengers... the carrier shall
not be liable if he proves that he and his servants and agents have taken all necessary
measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for them to take such measures."
Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, art. 20.
20. Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, art 25.
21. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 15, at 502.
22. Id. at 504.
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Hague. The United States suggested that the limitation on liability
be raised to approximately $25,000.23 The U.S. lowered its pro-
posed figure to $20,000 because of hostility from other conference
delegates. 4 When even this proposal was rejected, the United
States threatened to denounce the treaty. In the face of this threat,
it was agreed to raise the limit on liability to $16,000.2 This agree-
ment resulted in the Hague Protocol.2 6
Inevitably, dissatisfaction persisted. In 1965, the United States
formally denounced the Warsaw Convention. 7 In a State Depart-
ment press release, the United States indicated that if a higher re-
covery limit could be agreed upon,2" then the United States would
retract its notice of denunciation before the notice would take ef-
fect.29 Such raised recovery limits could be effected by a revision of
the existing Convention, or by a contractual agreement among the
air carriers.30 The prospect of United States' withdrawal from the
Warsaw Convention prodded other member nations to meet with
the United States in Montreal during February of 1966.31 These
meetings culminated in the Montreal Agreement. 2
The Montreal Agreement provides that most foreign and all
United States air carriers waive liability limitations up to a $75,000
23. Comment, The Revised Warsaw Convention and Other Aviation Disasters, 8 CUM.
L. REV. 764, 768 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Other Aviation Disasters].
24. Id.
25. Id. This figure approximately doubled the amount of a possible recovery under the
Convention.
26. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw, on October 12, 1929, 478 U.N.T.S. 371
(1955) [hereinafter cited as Hague Protocol].
27. Comment, Other Aviation Disasters, supra note 23, at 771 n.32. The text of the
notice of denuciation is printed in Press Release No. 268, November 15, 1965, 50 DFs'T. ST.
BULL. 923, 929 (1965).
28. Id. The United States indicated that an acceptable limitation would range between
$75,000 and $100,000 per passenger.
29. Article 39 of the Warsaw Convention provides that any member country may de-
nounce the Convention upon six months notice. Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, art. 39.
30. Comment, Other Aviation Disasters, supra note 23, at 771.
31. Comment, The Growth of American Judicial Hostility Towards the Liability Limi-
tations of the Warsaw Convention, 48 J. AIR L. & COM. 805, 812 (1983). See also Lowenfeld
& Mendelsohn, supra note 15, for a detailed discussion of. the events leading up to the
Montreal Agreement, as well as the relevant negotiations.
32. The Montreal Agreement is a contractual modification of the Warsaw Convention
as permitted under article 22(1). Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, art. 22(1). The modifi-
cation was undersigned by the airlines involved and not the member nations. As a contrac-
tual modification, the Montreal Agreement will not have the binding effect of a treaty until
it has been ratified by the United States Senate. Comment, Attempts to Circumvent the
Limitations, supra note 17, at 853.
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ceiling, inclusive of legal fees and costs. 3 In return for the reten-
tion of a limitation on recovery, the air carriers also agreed to
waive the due care defense available under article 20(1) of the
Warsaw Convention. 3 This, in effect, imposes strict liability on the
air carriers.
35
In 1971, the Guatamala Protocol" raised the limit on liability
to $100,000 and adopted the Montreal Agreement's standard of
strict liabilty.7 Unlike the Montreal Agreement, the Guatamala
Protocol required the member nations, rather than the airlines, to
agree to the terms of the Protocol. In addition, the Guatamala Pro-
tocol exempted the-airlines from liability for injuries which were
solely the result of the passenger's pre-existing physical condition.
The Guatemala Protocol has not been ratified in the United
States.3
The most recent attempt at raising the liability limitations
took place in 1983 when the United States Senate voted against
the ratification of Montreal Protocols 3 and 4.39 The primary effect
of Protocols 3 and 4 would have been to raise the limitation on
liability from $75,000 to $109,000, and to place a new ceiling on
awards while removing the exceptions provided for wilful miscon-
duct or failure to give notice of the limitations."
33. Note, Aviation Liability Limitations [or Wrongful Death or Personal Injury - A
Contemporary Analysis of the Warsaw System, 10 BROOKL'N J. INT'L L. 381, 386-87 (1984).
34. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 19.
35. Comment, Attempts to Circumvent the Limitations, supra note 17, at 853. The
effect of the elimination of the due care defense is to impose liability on the carrier for all
airplane crashes or disappearances, regardless of fault The carrier can still raise the defense
of contributory negligence or of an international act of the party bringing the action as a
defense.
36. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage by Air, ICAO Doc. No. 8932 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Guatamala
Protocol].
37. ld.
38. Comment, Attemps to Circumvent the Limitations, supra note 17, at 854. There
are several possible reasons for the non-ratification of the Guatemala Protocol by the United
States. The first may be that even the raised $100,000 limitation may be deemed inade-
quate. Another reason may be that the air carriers have successfully lobbied to bar further
raising of liability.
39. 129 CONo. REc. S2279 (daily ed. March 8, 1983).
40. De Vivo, The Warsaw Convention: Judicial Tolling of the Death Knell?, 49 J. AIR
L. & CoM. 71, 75 (1983).
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I. LOWER FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS
A. Warshaw; the Seminal Case
In addition to the various Warsaw Convention revisions, the
U.S. courts have gone to great lengths to provide recoveries."' For
example, the Ninth Circuit, in Saks, attempted to make one of the
strongest statements against airline liability limitations to date. By
imposing liability for injuries resulting from normal aircraft opera-
tions, the Ninth Circuit reached a decision completely contrary to
that of the Third Circuit on nearly identical facts. It was this con-
flict among the circuits that prompted the United States Supreme
Court to grant certorari.42
In Warshaw v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,4 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was con-
fronted with the same issue as that later raised in Saks; whether,
under the Warsaw Convention, a normal change in cabin pressuri-
zation, which resulted in hearing loss, qualified as an "accident"
within the meaning of article 17."' The court held that such normal
operation did not constitute an "accident" within the meaning of
article 17, and that the resulting injuries were not actionable.
45
The court had to determine whether this accident or occur-
rence was the type of "accident" contemplated by the Warsaw
41. For example there are decisions which use the Warsaw Convention as a device for
imposing liability, albeit limited, where no other theory is available. A second line of deci-
sions avoid any limitation on a plaintiff's recovery by adopting a number of legal theories
which circumvent the Convention entirely. Day v. Trans World Air Lines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976), and Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co.,
Ltd., 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd per curiam 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973) (the
word "accident" in article 17 of the Convention includes terrorist attacks thereby affording
passengers a remedy); Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, 253 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), afid, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 390
U.S. 455 (1968) (a ticket, though delivered, contained an inadequate warning concerning the
liability limits); In Re Air Crash at Bali, Indonesia, 462 F. Supp. 1114 (C.D. Cal. 1978)
(because decedent passengers were not in privity with the air carrier, they were not bound
by liability limitations in the contract). Thus, the Warsaw Convention is not an exclusive
remedy, and does not preclude alternative theories where they are available. When it does
apply, the Convention's limitation and theory are exclusive. Abramson v. Japan Airlines Co.,
Ltd., 739 F.2d 130, 134 (3d Cir. 1984).
42. 53 U.S.L.W. at 4270.
43. 442 F. Supp. 400 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
44. Id. at 401.
45. Id. at 412-13.
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Convention, thus warranting liability. 6 In making its determina-
tion, the court looked to the language of the Convention, the legis-
lative history of the treaty, subsequent acts of the contracting par-
ties, and the pertinent legal interpretation promulgated by "those
courts which have jurisdiction," in an effort to give a proper con-
struction to the term "accident." The court first observed that the
Montreal Agreement created an absolute liability standard for in-
juries proximately caused by some "accident" occurring on board
the plane or in the process of embarkation or debarkation. In its
review of the text of the Warsaw Convention, the court stated that
the Montreal Agreement being a contractual modification and not
an amendment to the treaty, had made no substantive or other
changes to article 17. Because, in the court's view, the text of the
Convention provided no basis for giving meaning to the word "ac-
cident," it next looked to U.S. case law.
At the outset of its examination of United States case law, the
Warshaw court noted that no prior decision had dealt with a fac-
tual situation in which an injury had been caused during the
course of a normal and routine flight. 8 The court reviewed deci-
sions in cases where there was no dispute over the meaning of the
term "accident" as used in the Convention.49 These cases involved
air crashes resulting in death. Finding no help in interpretation
from these cases, the court next reviewed decisions involving more
unusual fact situations. Several of these cases involved air carrier
liability to passengers resulting from hijackings and terrorist at-
tacks.50 In these cases, the intentional actions of third persons were
deemed to be "accidents" within the meaning of the Convention,
as modified by the Montreal Agreement."1 Finally, the court re-
viewed cases involving unusual falls. In one case, a woman fell
46. Id. at 407.
47. Id. at 408.
48. Id. at 404.
49. Id. at 408. The Court cited two cases: Berguido v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 369 F.2d
874 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 996 (1968); Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air
France, 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 905 (1968). The court noted that
neither of these cases turned on an interpretation of the word "accident." Rather, Berguido
dealt with the defense of due care and Block reviewed the applicability of the Warsaw Con-
vention to international charter flights. In neither case was there any dispute about whether
an air crash was an accident within the meaning of article 17.
50. The court cited Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (air carrier liable to passengers for acts of sabotage, i.e. hijacking); Evangelinos v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977) reh'g en Banc (terrorist attack on
passengers waiting to board aircraft is an "accident" within the meaning of article 17).
51. See Husserl, 351 F. Supp. at 707.
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from the doorway of an aircraft when a set of movable boarding
stairs were pulled away.52 While the court held that this occurrence
was an accident, the plaintiffs recovery was barred because she
was contributorily negligent, and the running of the two-year pe-
riod of limitations had expired." In another case a woman fell
while standing in the baggage claim area of an airport terminal. 4
The court held that the burden was on the plaintiff to prove the
existence of an accident, since her fall was unwitnessed, and that
this burden was not met where it seemed just as reasonable that
her physical condition caused the fall, as that an accident caused
the fall." At the close of the review of the cases, the court stated:
[T]he common thread has been a happening or an event which
in each case was beyond the normal and preferred mode of oper-
ation for the flight. In the case at bar, however, we are faced
with a causative link with an identifiable event - a change in
cabin pressure - which is part of the normal, anticipated and
established mode of procedure.""
Thus, under United States case law, Warshaw could not recover
because he had failed to satisfy the condition precedent to liability:
an "accident."
After briefly reviewing the history and policy of the Conven-
tion, 57 the court reviewed the acts of the parties subsequent to the
Montreal Agreement's enactment. The bulk of the court's discus-
sion centered on the Guatemala Protocol 8 and the debates con-
cerning some of the proposed revisions. The discussion at Guate-
52. Chutter v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 132 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). In Chut-
ter, the plaintiff had been escorted to her seat and the fasten seat belt sign was lighted.
Instead of fastening her seat belt, plaintiff got up, walked to the entrance of the aircraft,
and then fell.
53. Id. at 616. Article 21 of the Convention provides: "If the carrier proves that the
damage was caused by or contributed to by the negligence of the injured person the court
may in accordance with the provisions of its own law, exonerate the carrier wholly or partly
from his liability." Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, art. 25. Article 29 imposes a two year
period of limitations. Warsaw Convention, art. 29.
54. MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1971).
55. Id. at 1405. Plaintiff was a 74-year-old woman in good health. She fell while stand-
ing in an untrafficked section of the baggage claim area, and plaintiff failed to show the
existence of any luggage in the area which may have caused her to fall.
56. Warshaw, 442 F. Supp at 410.
57. The policies underlying the principles of absolute liability and limited compensa-
tion imposed by the Montreal Agreement which the Warshaw court referred to were: (a)
rapid settlement of disputes without extended litigation; (b) lowered legal fees; and (c) lim-
ited liability to air carriers in case of a major catastrophe. Warshaw, 442 F. Supp. at 410.
58. Guatemala Protocol supra note 36.
[Vol. 16:3
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mala centered on article 17, which was revised to read:
The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or
personal injury of a passenger upon condition only that the
event which caused the death or injury took place on board the
aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or
disembarking. However, the carrier is not liable if the death or
injury resulted solely from the state of health of the passenger.59
The drafters were concerned that the substitution of the word
"event" for the word "accident" unduly broadened the scope of the
article, and for that reason included the last sentence of the re-
vised article.60 As a result of this drafting, a passenger who suffered
a heart attack brought about by fright from sudden turbulence
would be able to recover under the revised article 17, but a passen-
ger who suffered a heart attack brought about by acceleration upon
take-off or deceleration upon landing would not recover. 1 The
court concluded that the term "accident" was to be given a com-
mon sense meaning.2 Thus, an accident would be "an untoward
event, out of the ordinary, triggered by some external event," in
contrast to an occurrence which may come about under normal op-
erating conditions as a result of the passenger's own weakness or
disability. 3 To constitute an "accident," the occurrence which
causes injury would have to be an unusual or unexpected happen-
ing.84 Because the repressurization of the cabin on Mr. Warshaw's
flight was not an unsual or unexpected happening, but a part of
the normal aircraft operations, the court entered judgment in favor
of TWA. 5
The holding of the court in Warshaw is straightforward: under
article 17, the air carrier is liable for a passenger's injuries when
the injuries are the result of an unusual or unexpected happen-
ing.6 This tracks the language of article 17, and is consistent with
all prior decisions under the Convention. The Warshaw rationale
has been accepted in numerous subsequent decisions, including De
59. Id. art. 17.
60. Warshaw, 442 F. Supp. at 411.
61. Id. at 412.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 413.
65. Id.
66. Note, Aviation - Warsaw Convention - Air Carriers' Liability for "Accidents"
Under Article 17 Defined to Exclude Injury Caused by Routine Repressurization of Jet
Aircraft, 4 INT'L TRADE L. J. 281, 291 (1979).
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Marines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines,0 7 where the Third Circuit
was presented with a nearly identical fact situation. Most recently,
the Warshaw result was followed by the Supreme Court in its re-
versal of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Saks.
B. The Ninth Circuit's Decision in Saks
The Ninth Circuit was guided by the notion that the Conven-
tion no longer mandated a showing of malfunction or abnormality
in the operation of the aircraft as a condition precedent to recov-
ery." The basis of this conclusion was that the "[ilmposition of
such a requirement is not supported by either the language and
history of the Warsaw Convention . . . or the decisions of many
courts, including this one, which now interpret the convention as
imposing absolute liability for injuries proximately caused by the
risks inherent in air travel."' 9 Accordingly, the court began its
analysis with a review of the language of the treaty.
The majority first noted that before article 17 could be in-
voked, an accident must have occurred.70 The Convention, how-
ever, failed to define the term "accident." To find an appropriate
definition, the court of appeals looked to two sources: the common
dictionary definition and the definition contained in the Conven-
tion on International Aviation.71 The former defined an accident as
an "event occuring by chance or arising from unknown causes.""2
The Convention on International Aviation defines an accident as
''an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which
67. DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 580 F.2d 1193 (3rd Cir. 1978). See also,
Abramson v. Japan Airlines Co., Ltd., 739 F.2d 130 (3rd Cir. 1984) (aggravation of a pas-
sanger's hernia allegedly due to the crew's failure to provide a place to lie down did not
constitute an "accident" within the meaning of article 17); Oliver v. Scandanavian Airlines
System, 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 118,283 (D. Md. 1983) (injury was caused by an accident where
an intoxicated passanger fell on plaintiff); Lautore v. United Airlines, Inc., 16 Av. Cas.
(CCH) 1 17,944 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (dismissed on motion for summary judgment where plaintiff
conceded there had been no "accident"); Weintraub v. Capitol International Airways, 16 Av.
Cas. (CCH) 18,058 (N.Y. Supp. App. Term 1981) (severe air turbulence causing a precipi-
tous descent constituted an "accident" resulting in passenger's hearing impairment).
68. Saks, 724 F.2d at 1384.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1385. On its face, it seems contradictory that the court would recognize article
17's requirement of an "accident" and yet discount the need for a malfunction in the air-
craft's operations as a condition precedent to recovery. However, this incongruity is resolved





takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with
the intention of flight and all such persons have disembarked, and
in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in which the
aircraft receives substantial damage."7 The court found that the
injury suffered by Saks (hearing loss resulting from cabin depres-
surization), squarely fit the second definition as an "occurrence as-
sociated with the operation of an aircraft." '74 Under this definition,
although there was no malfunction or abnormality in the operation
of the aircraft, there had been an accident within the meaning of
article 17. That the facts of the case fit the definition was found
persuasive, but not dispositive of the issue.
The court of appeals next reviewed the history of the Conven-
tion; it originally established a fault-based system for liability. The
air carrier had the burden of establishing a lack of negligence .7
Next, the court found that the contractual modification of the
Convention by the Montreal Agreement had imposed absolute lia-
bility on the air carriers, eliminating any defense of due care in
article 20(1).76 The court concluded that allowing a carrier to avoid
liability under the Convention by showing that a plaintiffis injury
was not the result of an accident because it had resulted from nor-
mal aircraft operations was, in effect, a restatement of the defense
of due care.77 Thus, to require an "accident" as a condition prece-
dent to recovery would frustrate the policy of the revised Conven-
tion. U.S. courts have been construing the word "accident" broadly
in order to effectuate better passenger protectiona.7  For example
"accident" has been construed to result in air carrier liability for
hijackings and other terrorist activities.78 Tangential to this analy-
sis, the court reviewed the policies underlying the decision to
switch from negligence to absolute liability. The court found three




76. Id. at 1385-86.
77. 724 F.2d at 1385.
78. Id. at 1387.
79. Id. Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 351 F. Supp. at 706. Hijacking's were proba-
bly not within the contemplation of the parties at the time the Warsaw Convention was
promulgated. The Montreal Agreement serves to resolve whatever doubt existed regarding
the construction of the word "accident." Neither State Department press releases nor Civil
Aeronautics Board orders mention the word "accident" in the context of recovering for per-
sonal injury. Instead they seem to accept the proposition that the Montreal Agreement im-
poses "absolute liability" upon the carrier.
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riers to reach quick and inexpensive settlements; under theories of
accident cost allocation, the belief that airlines were better able to
bear the burden of costs; and because the passenger was in the
carrier's control, the belief that the carrier was in the best position
to prevent accidents."0 The court felt justified in imposing liability
for injuries resulting from normal aircraft operations. The majority
concluded that causation should be the only issue considered by
future courts."1
Thus, for the court of appeals, the only question was whether
the depressurization caused the hearing loss. The court stated that
the Second and Third Circuits, by analyzing "how the carrier was
operating at the time the injury occurred" were out of step with
the current trend of imposing absolute liability on air carriers for
flight related injuries."2
The dissent in Saks adhered to the Third Circuit's "unusual
and unexpected happening" standard. It found that normal cabin
depressurization did not constitute an accident within the meaning
of the Convention. While acknowledging that the majority had
well-supported its conclusion, the dissent did not find it necessary
to go outside of the text of the Convention to find a definition for
the word "accident." Instead, the dissent looked to article 18(1) for
help in finding a definition.83 It concluded that the Convention
contemplated "carrier liability for accidents injuring people and
for occurrences damaging goods." 4 Since the Convention itself dis-
tinguished between accidents and occurrences, the court should
have tailored its definition in a similar fashion. The dissent looked
favorably on the Third Circuit's distinction which required some
''unusual or unexpected happening." The dissent determined that
since this definition had nothing to do with negligence, or the lack
thereof, it would not undermine any concern for the elimination of
the due care defense.
8 5
80. Saks, 724 F.2d. at 1387.
81. Id. at 1384. The court stated that it interpreted the Convention as imposing abso-
lute liability for "injuries proximately caused by the risks inherent in air travel."
82. Id. at 1388. To pursue such an analysis would, in effect, be to determine whether or
not the carrier was negligent at the time the injury occurred.
83. Id. at 1388. The full text of article 18(1) reads: "The carrier is liable for damage
sustained in the event of the destruction or loss of, or damage to, any registered baggage, if
the occurrence which caused the damage so sustained took place during the carriage by air."
Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, art. 18.
84. 724 F.2d at 1389.
85. Id. at 1389.
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The dissent was careful to note two features of the majority
decision which it found to raise serious problems. First, the effect
of the majority decision was to make the air carrier the insurer of
the health of its passengers. 6 Second, the majority's decision cre-
ated a conflict between the circuits, frustrating any uniformity in
the Convention's interpretation.
8 7
The dissent concluded that it would have affirmed the district
court."8 This decision was based, in part, on a literal reading of the
Convention's text. The dissent also took into account the possible
impact the majority's decision might have on the air industry.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT AMONG
THE CIRCUITS
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision 9
finding that a normal change in cabin pressure, resulting in injury
to a passenger, does not constitute a sufficient "accident" within
the meaning of article 17 to establish liability. To warrant air car-
rier liability, a passenger's injury must be caused by an "unex-
pected or unusual event or happening that is external to the pas-
senger."90 The Court based this determination upon an analysis of
the text, the negotiating history and the treatment of the Warsaw
Convention in American courts and courts of other signatory
nations.
The Supreme Court stated that Air France could only be lia-
ble to Saks if she proved that an "accident" was the cause of her
injury. Whether an injury caused by normal aircraft operations, as
here, would satisfy this requirement would depend upon an inter-
pretation of article 17.9 The Court's analysis began with the text
of the Convention, comparing the wording of article 1792 and arti-
86. Id. The dissent stated that under the majority's holding, the carrier would be abso-
lutely liable for any happening causing injury to a passenger. Thus a heart patient who
suffered a heart attack during a normal takeoff would be able to recover, despite the fact
that a takeoff is not an unusual occurrence. The dissent also pointed out that under the
Third Circuits test, which requires an "unusual or unexpected occurrence," a passenger
would be able to recover for even minor accidents, such as burns resulting from coffee
spilled during air turbulence.
87. 724 F.2d at 1390.
88. Id.
89. Air France v. Saks, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4271.
90. Id. at 4273.
91. Id. at 4271.
92. See supra note 7 for the text of article 17.
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cle 18." First, the Court noted that article 17 described the terms
by which an airline would be liable to passengers. Article 17 em-
ployed the word "accident" in describing the condition precedent.
Article 18, on the other hand, described an airline's liability for
damages to baggage and employed the word "occurrence" in
describing the condition precedent. The court reasoned that the
drafters did not intend that an "occurrence" would result in liabil-
ity to a passenger. The use of the different operative words is in-
dicative of a difference in meaning.94 Second, the Court concluded
that article 17 required that an "accident," no matter how defined,
be the cause of the injury9 s While the mere occurrence of an injury
could be loosely termed an "accident," in regard to legal liabilities
an "accident" denotes the cause of an injury. 6
The Court next looked to the French legal meaning of the
word "accident." Because the Convention was originally drafted in
French, the Court reasoned that the French legal meaning of "acci-
dent" would provide a "meaning consistent with the shared expec-
tations of the contracting parties. '9 7 The Court looked to French
cases and dictionaries, and concluded that the word "accident"
had virtually the same meaning in French, English, German, and
American jurisprudence.9 s The Court stated that when the French
word for accident is used to describe the cause of an injury, it is
"usually defined as a fortuitous, unexpected, unusual, or unin-
tended event,"'9 and that this parallels the American usage.10 The
Court concluded that on the basis of its' understanding of the text
of the Convention, any injury would have to be caused by an unex-
pected or unusual event.'
93. See supra note 83 for the text of article 18(1).
94, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4271.
95. 53 U.S.L.W. at 4271-72. The Court noted:
The word accident is not a technical legal term with a clearly defined meaning.
Speaking generally, but with reference to legal liabilities, an accident means any
unintended and unexpected occurrence which produces hurt or loss. But it is
often used to denote any unintended and unexpected loss or hurt apart from its
cause; and if the cause is not known the loss or hurt itself would certainly be
called an accident. The word "accident" is also often used to denote both the
cause and the effect, no attempt being made to discriminate between them.
Id. (Quoting from Fenton v. Thorly & Co., A.C. 443, 453 (1903)).








The Court was further persuaded in its reasoning by reviewing
the negotiating history of the Convention and the subsequent con-
duct of the parties. The Court's initial focus was on the separate
liability provisions incorporated in articles 17 and 18. These were
developed because of objections by various delegates to the text of
the original draft.l02 Many felt that liability for damage to, or loss
of, baggage should commence upon embarkation. l0 The result was
the current distinction between liability under article 17 and arti-
cle 18. The President of the drafting committee suggested that it
would be better to separate the various liability provisions. 104 Con-
sequently, the Court reasoned that the causes of liability under
each provision were to be different.' 3 On this basis, the Court con-
cluded that the drafting history of the Convention supported the
theory that an "accident" must be the cause of the injury, and not
be the injury itself. In reviewing the subsequent conduct of the
parties, the Court looked to the negotiations in Guatemala, espe-
cially those concerning revisions of article 17.106 During the negoti-
ations, the Convention signatories amended the Convention to im-
pose liability on the carrier for an "event" which caused death or
injury, rather than for an "accident" producing those results.10 7
The Court found it significant that the Guatamala delegates
viewed the substitution of the word "event" for the word "acci-
dent" as "expanding the scope of carrier liability to passengers. "108
Consequently, the Court was further persuaded to give a narrow
construction to the word "accident" in article 17.
Finally, the Court looked to the judicial opinions of other sig-
102. Id. The original draft provided:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained during carriage:
(a) in the case of death, wounding, or any other bodily injury suffered by a
traveler;
(b) in the case of destruction, loss, or damage to goods or baggage;
(c) in the case of delay suffered by a traveler, goods, or baggage.
(International Conference on Air Law Affecting Air Questions, Minutes, Second Interna-
tional Conference on Private Aeronautical Law, October 4-12, 1929, Warsaw 264-65 (R.
Homer & D. Legrez trans. 1975)) [hereinafter Warsaw Proceedings].
103. 53 U.S.L.W. at 4272.
104. Id. at 4272-73. The President stated: "[Gliven that there are entirely different lia-
bility cases: death or wounding, disappearance of goods, delay, we have deemed that it
would be better to begin by setting out the causes of liability for persons, then for goods and
baggage, and finally for liability in the case of delay. Id. at 4273 (Warsaw Proceedings at
205).
105. 53 U.S.L.W. at 4273.
106. Id. See, supra text accompanying note 59 for the revised article 17.




natory nations. The Court noted that French courts interpreted ar-
ticle 17 to require fortuitous or unpredictable causes of injury.109
Likewise, other European legal scholars interpreted article 17 to
require the injury to have been caused by an event other than nor-
mal aircraft operations.1 0 The Court found that these views were
consistent with American interpretations, and that while the U.S.
courts defined "accident" broadly, they "refuse to extend the term
to cover routine travel procedures that produce an injury due to
the peculiar internal condition of a passenger." '
The Court's ultimate conclusion was that carrier liability
under article 17 arises only if the passenger's injury was the result
of an unexpected or unusual event external to the passenger. A
broad interpretation of "accident" would allow recovery in case of
torts committed by other passengers.11 2 In no case, however, would
the carrier be liable to a passenger who's injury was the result of
normal aircraft operations coupled with the passenger's own inter-
nal infirmity. To satisfy the provisions of article 17, a passenger
would only have to establish that some link in the chain of causa-
tion of his injury was an unusual or unexpected event." 3
The Court, while acknowledging that the Montreal Agreement
eliminated the due care defense under article 20(1),1" stated that
the Convention did not provide for true absolute liability." 5 Arti-
cle 17 and article 20(1) are separate provisions, and involve differ-
ent inquiries. Article 17 does not inquire into the care taken by the
airline to avoid injury, but only into the nature of the event which
caused the injury. The elimination of article 20(1) does not rede-
fine the air carrier's liability, but only takes one of its defenses." 6
Finally, the Court found that definitions of "accidents" pro-
vided in Annex 13 to the Convention on International Aviation
were inapplicable here. Annex 13 deals with accident investiga-




112. Id. The Court cited decisions allowing recovery for injuries caused by intoxicated
passengers, or terrorist attacks.
113. Id. at 4274.
114. See supra notes 19 and 35.
115. 53 U.S.L.W. at 4274.
116. Id.
117. Id. The Court also declined to determine the merits of Saks' state law claims,
leaving them to the appellate court in the first instance.
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN SAKS
Whether conscious or not, the Supreme Court's analysis in
Saks is strikingly similar to the analysis employed in Warshaw.
Both focus on the "accident" element, and define it as an unusual
or unexpected happening causing injury.11 Both also require the
accident to have been the cause of the injury. The Supreme
Court's decision and the Ninth Circuit opinion in Saks, while dif-
fering sharply in analysis and result, also have characteristics in
common.
The Ninth Circuit's test was whether an "accident," defined as
a risk inherent in air travel, was the cause of the injury.119 Thus,
the court would have assigned liability under article 17 if any air-
craft operation caused the injury, even if that operation was
normal.
The "risk inherent in air travel" definition was based primar-
ily on two factors: the Convention on International Aviation's defi-
nition and the Montreal Agreement's apparent imposition of abso-
lute liability on the air carriers.20 At first glance, the Supreme
Court's rejection of these factors appears well grounded. The court
of appeals reviewed sources outside of the Convention to interpret
the word "accident." It gave no justification for this approach, and
the definition selected was suspiciously self-serving. The Supreme
Court's reliance on the distinctions between article 17 and article
18 allowed it to use the language of the Convention in context to
discern the meanings of its words.
The Court was astute to discern that when the Montreal
Agreement eliminated article 20(1)'s due care defense, none of the
other provisions were affected. The Court's conclusion that an "ac-
cident" is still required is logically correct.
The Supreme Court's test for air carrier liability, whether an
accident, defined as an unexpected or unusual event,121 was the
cause of the injury, allows recovery only if the injury was caused by
some sort of aircraft malfunction.' 22 The Court noted that even in
French, the word "accident" is defined in more than one way."'
118. See supra text accompanying notes 63 and 90.
119. See supra text accompanying note 69.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 73 and 76.
121. 53 U.S.L.W. at 4273.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 4272. The Court's French definition indicated that an "accident" can "refer
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The Court chose the meaning that supported its contention that
an "accident" describes the cause of the injury, and not the injury
itself. No explicit reason, however, was given for choosing the for-
mer usage over the latter.
The Court garnered further support for its interpretation of
article 17 by turning to the actions of fellow signatory nations. The
Court found their positions to be in accord with U.S. interpreta-
tions.12 4 Again, the Court gave virtually no explanation for its deci-
sion to rely on the way in which other countries construed article
17.
Despite the different approaches to the definition of the word
"accident," both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit agree
that causation is fundamental. 125 It is conceivable that in future
cases a plaintiff could recover for hearing loss caused by "normal"
cabin pressurization by scrutinizing the standards for what is nor-
mal, and establishing negligence. A plaintiff would have to prove
that the industry standards governing the rate of descent and ad-
justments in cabin pressure are themselves below a judicially im-
posed standard of care.120 Establishing this would permit a court to
find that the aircraft's operations had in fact been abnormal, thus
warranting a finding that there was an accident causing injury.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the Supreme Court's decision in Saks is doctrinally
sound, as a matter of policy, a different result is dictated. When a
passenger is injured on a flight, it is clearly the airline that is best
able to bear the costs. Passengers certainly don't anticipate being
injured on normal, routine flights. They more likely than not have
made no provisions for such an event. The result is a passenger
bearing the costs which are more easily born by a carrier with
greater resources. Requiring the air carrier to indemnify the pas-
to the event of an injury" or could describe the cause. In support of the latter, the Court
defined "accident" as an "Ev6nement fortuit et ficheaux, causant des dommages corporel ov
mat6riels" (1 Grand Larousse de La Langue Francais 29 (1971)).
124. 53 U.S.L.W. at 4273.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 119 and 122.
126. As one court has stated: "[A] whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adop-
tion of new and available devices. It may never set its own tests. . .. Courts must in the end
say what is required; there are precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard
will not excuse their omission." The T.J.Hooper, 60 F.2d 734, 740 (2nd Cir. 1932) (tug boat
owners negligent for not installing radio sets on tugs despite lack of such industry custom).
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sengers who are injured through no fault of their own also makes
sense in terms of who is better able to allocate the risks. The air
carrier is in a position to take into account the rare occurrence of a
passenger injured by normal operations. To recover any amounts
paid to passengers, the air carrier could simply raise its rates. Any
rate increases to individual passengers would be nominal. Since
many of the foreign air carriers are already government sub-
sidized, this form of risk spreading becomes less harsh. Finally, im-
posing liability on the air carrier in this situation may serve as an
impetus to improve air travel safety. Air carriers may be en-
couraged to find ways of making flights safer and more comforta-
ble. Their goal would be to eliminate all "normal operations" that
lead to injury.
Had the Supreme Court adopted the Ninth Circuit's view, the
decision would likely have been subject to a conflicting reception
by both the airline industry and their insurance underwriters. The
initial reaction would have been hostile. The carriers would have
been liable to a new class of plaintiffs for injuries, which at the
time, they could not conceivably prevent. As a result of an increase
in litigation and damage awards (or settlements), insurance under-
writers would raise their rates. On the other hand, both the airline
industry and their insurance underwriters would have perceived a
long term benefit. The Warsaw Convention has been subject to nu-
merous attacks in recent years. In fact, some have suggested mak-
ing unlimited liability available to international passengers. Air
carriers would obviously prefer to avoid this turn of events. The
Ninth Circuit's decision in Saks could have served the airline in-
dustry by at least delaying the complete elimination of limited lia-
bility. While the Ninth Circuit decision expanded the class of
plaintiffs who could recover from the air carriers, all plaintiffs sub-
ject to the Convention would still have been limited to a maximum
recovery of $75,000. For the carriers it may indeed have been pref-
erable to have more claims brought against them, subject to lim-
ited recoveries, than it would be to have fewer claims with unlim-
ited liability. The Ninth Circuit decision could, therefore, have
been a happy medium. The Congress would have been placated
into allowing the Convention to stand because of the expanded
cause of action , and the airlines would have been pleased with any
trade-off necessary to retain limited liability.
By reversing the Ninth Circuit, and adhering to a narrow in-
terpretation of article 17, the Supreme Court has seemingly indi-
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cated that it considers the Convention a viable treaty. The decision
does not, unfortunately, resolve remaining dissatisfaction with the
limitations on liability. The lower courts have manifested their dis-
satisfaction with the limitations through creative avoidance of the
Convention's terms. The Supreme Court in Saks has shut off one
such potential avenue of avoidance. By doing so, the Supreme
Court has, in effect, indicated that it does not consider it the
Court's duty to act in this matter. Rather, the Court is leaving it to
Congress to act. This may be based, in part, on the recognition
that an entirely new system is needed for regulating air carrier
liability.
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